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Abstract 
The disclosure of leniency materials held by competition authorities has recently 
been under the spot. On the one hand, these documents could greatly help cartel 
victims to prove the damage and the causation link when filing damage actions 
against cartelists. On the other hand, future cartelists could be deterred from applying 
for leniency since damage actions could be brought as a result of the information 
submitted by themselves. Neither the current legislation nor the case law have 
attained yet to sufficiently clarify how to deal with this clash of interests. 
Our approach obviously attempts to strike a balance between both interests. But not 
only that. We see the current debate as a great opportunity to boost the private 
enforcement of antitrust law through the positive spillovers of leniency programmes. 
We hence propose to build a bridge between the public and the private enforcement 
by enabling a partial disclosure of the documents.  
 
1. Introduction 
Let us imagine a city, Antitrust Land, divided in two parts by a river. The growth of the 
city depends on its capacity to attract visitors. One part of the city attracts a lot of 
visitors (cartelists) since it is very well connected in terms of access (leniency 
programmes) and is therefore very rich. Everybody looks happy about that part of the 
city: the Mayor (the European Commission), since the whole country talks nicely 
about its access infrastructures, and tourist services (law firms), as they make a lot of 
money with visitors. This part of the city is called Public Enforcement Town and its 
citizen is the abstract consumer. 
The other part of the city is called Private Enforcement Town, where the concrete 
consumer lives. It is surrounded by mountains. As a result of this, it is clearly not as 
wealthy as the other one since visitors hardly ever pass by. Besides, the level of 
income greatly varies from one neighbourhood to another one as some parts of the 
town are better connected due to their own cableways. These three neighbourhoods 
are called United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands. 
At some point, somebody realizes that a bridge linking both parts (disclosure of 
leniency materials) of the city could contribute to attract tourists to Private 
Enforcement Town and therefore to boost its economic growth. Nevertheless, tourist 
services are clearly against and they say that Private Enforcement Town is so ugly 
that tourists will immediately leave the city and never be back. They also say that 
with that bridge in the future nobody will be tempted to come to Antitrust Land. 
The question is not as simple as ‘bridge: yes or no?’. If yes, it must also be decided 
its location. It could link the heart of both parts (total disclosure of leniency 
documents) or it could be built in the surroundings of the city (disclosure of pre-
existing documents). 
What should the Mayor do? 
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This story draws an analogy with the current situation of access to leniency materials 
in the context of antitrust damages. This issue entails a legal clash between the 
public and private enforcement of competition law, in particular, leniency 
programmes versus civil damage actions.  
Every time there is a confrontation between two divergent interests we can find 
stakeholders on both sides. This case is not an exception. However, we think that in 
this particular one, supporters of public enforcement enjoy more visibility in the EU 
arena than those who advocate for a stronger private enforcement.  
On the public enforcement side we find the European Commission (hereinafter 
‘Commission’), law firms and the industry. The Commission, although officially puts 
forward that both public and private enforcement merit the same prominence, is 
concerned that the disclosure of leniency materials put at risk its successful leniency 
programme.  
Cartelists need the advice of law firms when applying for leniency, and these latter 
are hence eager to preserve a programme that provides them with a significant 
source of revenues. In the same vein, the industry does not have any interest in 
boosting the antitrust private enforcement.  
In contrast, it is more difficult to identify the supporters of a stronger private 
enforcement due to the diffused nature of cartel victims. Direct victims of a cartel 
usually pass on the increased price to its own buyers. This usually leads to a 
situation where end consumers are the most affected actors by the cartel. 
Who protects end consumers in the field of competition law? Non-governmental 
organizations, watchdogs, consumer organizations are, inter alia, normally 
responsible for taking this role. Nevertheless, they often focus their efforts on other 
fields, such as environment and regulatory affairs. 
This paper aims to analyse the difficult cohabitation between the leniency 
programmes and the disclosure of leniency materials to potential claimants. In the 
second chapter we present the legal framework and functioning of the three 
cornerstones of the debate: the leniency programmes, the exercise of civil damage 
actions and the access to documents held by public authorities. 
In the third chapter we assess two potential alternatives to gain access to leniency 
materials held by the Commission: Article 15(1) of Regulation 1/2003 and the 
Transparency Regulation. The fourth chapter deals with the access to leniency 
documents held by National Competition Authorities (NCAs) in the light of Pfleiderer 
ruling and the follow-up in some jurisdictions.  
In our fifth chapter we present our optimal regime of disclosure of leniency materials 
by answering seven questions about the most important features of this regime. In 
the sixth chapter we provide the Major with our solution and we draw our final 
conclusions.  
 
2. Legal framework and functioning at the EU level 
The controversy arising from the disclosure of leniency documents touches upon not 
only the general regime for the disclosure of documents kept by NCAs and the 
Commission, but also the legal framework of leniency programmes and the private 
enforcement of competition law. Therefore, it is noteworthy describing individually the 
legal framework and functioning of this problematic triangle: leniency programmes, 
private enforcement of competition law and disclosure of public documents. 
 
2.1 Legal framework and functioning of leniency programmes to detect cartels 
Leniency programmes were implemented in the EU in 1996, although the current 
policy is set by the Commission Leniency Notice (hereinafter ‘Notice’)1 from 2006. 
The Notice established two kinds of immunities: total and partial immunity, but it puts 
                                                          
1Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, OJ C 298, 8.12.2006, 
p. 17–22. 
forward that this does not prevent third parties from filing civil actions as a result of 
damages arising from the cartel2. Nevertheless, it underlines that the making of 
corporate statements should not entail a comparative disadvantage in the civil 
litigation for the whistleblower as regards with the rest of cartelists3. This leads to a 
non-disclosure policy of corporate statements and the possibility to provide them 
orally. 
The Notice defines corporate statements as those documents prepared specially to 
take part in a leniency programme where the undertaking presents its knowledge of a 
cartel and its role therein4. Corporate statements can be accompanied by pre-
existing documents5, which are those relevant documents to prove the cartel not 
created for the purpose of applying for leniency. The Notice remains silent as regards 
with the potential access to pre-existing documents by third parties.  
The second guarantee to protect whistleblowers from private actions is the possibility 
to provide the Commission with oral instead of written corporate statements6. This is 
due to the discovery procedure existing in the Common Law systems, where a judge 
may impose a party to provide the other party with specific documents in the course 
of civil litigation. Thus, the oral statement is rendered into writing by the Commission 
and the whistleblower cannot be forced by a judge to disclose corporate statements 
since they are not whistleblower`s documents.  
The evaluation of leniency programme as a policy tool in the EU shows positive 
outcomes. In the last decade more and more cases have been detected through this 
system and currently nearly all cartel cases begin with a whistleblower7. This has led 
most of Member States to adopt their own national leniency programmes. 
 
2.2 Legal framework and functioning of private enforcement as regards with cartels 
The Court of Justice (hereinafter ‘the Court’) established in Courage Ltd v Crehan8 
and Manfredi9 that Article 101 TFEU has direct effect. This means that individuals 
can invoke it before a national court when filing a damage action for a loss caused by 
a conduct or contract liable to harm competition. The Court added that, in the 
absence of EU rules, Member States must provide national procedural and 
substantive rules to allow the exercise of this right observing the principles of 
effectiveness and equivalence10.  
Articles 15 and 16 of Regulation 1/200311 touch upon the private enforcement by 
national courts. They need to be read together with the Commission Cooperation 
Notice12. Article 15 deals with the different types of cooperation between national 
courts and the Commission. It is noteworthy recalling that, according to the 
Cooperation Notice, the request by national courts for information or an opinion, does 
not enable the national court to obtain confidential information and business secrets 
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3Ibid, para. 6. 
4Ibid, para. 31. 
5Ibid, para. 6. 
6Ibid, para.32. 
7Richard WHISH & David BAILEY, Competition Law, p.289, Seventh edition, Oxford University Press, 
2012. 
8Judgment of the Court of 20 September 2001, Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v 
Courage Ltd and Others, Reference for a preliminary ruling: Court of Appeal (England and Wales) (Civil 
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12Commission Notice on the cooperation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member 
States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, OJ C 101, 27.4.2004. 
unless the court guarantee its protection13. Even more interesting, the Commission 
will not share with national courts the information voluntarily submitted by a leniency 
applicant without its consent14. 
Article 16 touches upon the uniform application of EU law and it thus attempts to 
clarify the effect of Commission decisions on national courts. This article states that 
national courts are bound by Commission decisions on the same matters15, as the 
Court confirmed in Europese Gemeenschap v Otis16. 
In the context of follow-on actions after a Commission decision, the Court put forward 
that the national court is required to accept the existence of the infringement. 
Nevertheless, the plaintiff still needs to prove before the court ‘the existence of loss 
and of direct causal link between the loss and the agreement’17. In conclusion, there 
are three requirements to establish liability for damages: an infringement of 
competition law, a damage and a casual link between the infringement and the 
damage. The existence of a previous decision by a competition agency is not 
indispensable to file an action for damages18, but it obviously alleviates the 
evidentiary burden.  
The exercise of actions for damage differs from one Member States to another as a 
result of different national substantive and procedural rules. In 2004 the Commission 
entrusted Ashurst to carry out a report to compare the private enforcement systems 
within the EU and found an ‘astonishing diversity and total underdevelopment’19. 
Rules of evidence concerning the requirement to establish liability also vary across 
Member States. For instance, although Commission decisions are legally binding to 
prove an infringement of competition law in all the jurisdictions, this is not the case for 
NCA decisions: they are accepted as evidence in the proceedings but in some 
jurisdictions they are not binding20.  
The functioning of damage claim systems within the EU is far from being optimal. In 
addition to the hurdles abovementioned, there are other obstacles, such as costs of 
litigation, limitation periods to bring actions or unfamiliarity with competition law 
among national judges21 that undermine the exercise of damage actions.  
The Commission is aware of the inefficiencies of the system of damage claims in 
relation to competition law infringements and has published a Green Paper22 in 2005 
and a White Paper23 in 2008. The Green Paper identified some of the main obstacles 
such as rules of access to evidence, the position of indirect purchasers and collective 
redress mechanisms. The White Paper lays down several recommendations as 
regards with the level of disclosure to evidence, the binding effect of NCAs decisions 
or the type of damage that should be claimed. 
The Commission has recently launched a proposal of legislation on EU antitrust 
damage claims which aims to strike a balance between the right to compensation 
and the smooth functioning of leniency programmes24. The most relevant points 
touched upon by the proposal are: 
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16Judgment of the Court on 6th November 2006, Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV and Others, 
Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank van koophandel te Brussel (Belgium), C-199/11. 
17Ibid, rec.65. 
18Regulation 1/2003, Art. 6. 
19Ashurst (Prepared by Denis Waelbroeck, Donald Slater and Gil Even-Shoshan), Study on the 
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REPORT, p.11, 31.8.2004. 
20Ibid, p.79. 
21The American Antitrust Institute and Jonathan (W. Cuneo, Cuneo, Gilbert & LaDuca) The International 
Handbook on Private Enforcement of Competition Law, p.279, Ed.Alber A. Foer, 2010. 
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23White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM/2008/0165, 2.4.2008. 
24Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing 
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− Rules on disclosure of evidence: three levels of disclosure are established 
depending on the type of document, for instance, it proposes absolute protection of 
corporate statements25. 
− Limited liability for leniency applicants: instead of being severally and jointly 
liable for the harm caused by the cartel, successful leniency applicants would be only 
held liable for their share of the cartel26. 
− Introduction of the passing-on defence: cartelists will be entitled to invoke the 
passing-on defence when an injured party has reduced its losses by passing to its 
own customers27.  
 
2.3 Legal framework and functioning of access to documents held by competition 
authorities 
Public access to documents held by the EU institutions is a citizen´s right recognized 
both in Article 15 TFEU and in Article 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. The right is granted to EU citizens, EU residents or legal persons 
settled within the EU and the applicant can exercise without showing any specific 
interest.  
The secondary law has developed this right through the Regulation 1049/2001 
(hereinafter ‘Transparency Regulation’)28, which defines the principles, conditions 
and limits regarding access to documents held by the institutions. It does not include 
any reference to competition issues; however, its applicability to competition 
proceedings was confirmed by the General Court (GC) in Technische Glaswerke 
Ilmenau (TGI)29. Likewise, Article 4.2 is often invoked by the Commission to deny 
public access to competition documents. In particular, it often justifies the refusal on 
the grounds of the ‘commercial interest of a natural or legal person’30 or/and ‘the 
purpose of inspections, investigations and audits’31. 
The institution concerned must in principle explain how access to a particular 
document may affect the interest protected by Article 4.2 following a case-by-case 
approach. Additionally, the GC put forward in TGI that the Commission would be 
obliged to examine if the disclosure of the documents could specifically and actually 
harm the interested protected and if there is no overriding public interest in 
disclosure. This analysis must be accomplished in respect of each document and this 
had to be shown in the decision32. 
However, the Court recognizes the possibility for the EU institution to deviate from 
this case-by-case approach and base its decisions ‘on general presumptions which 
apply to certain categories of documents’33. In particular, the Court has already 
confirmed the existence of these general presumptions which enable the 
Commission to dismiss requests regarding specific State aid and merger related 
documents. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Member States and of the European Union, Stragsbourg, 11th June 2013, COM(2013) 404 
final,2013/0185 (COD). 
25Ibid, Arts 5-8. 
26Ibid, Arts 9-11. 
27Ibid, Arts 12-15. 
28Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p.43-
48. 
29Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber) of 14 December 2006, Technische Glaswerke 
Ilmenau GmbH v Commission of the European Communities, T-237/02. 
30Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, Art. 4.2, para.1. 
31Ibid, para.3. 
32Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 1 July 2008, Sweden and Turco v Council, 
Joined Cases C-39/05 and C-52/05, rec. 49. 
33Ibid, rec. 50. 
Thus, the Court confirmed in TGI that a general presumption arises from Regulation 
659/199934, which regulates access to information obtained during State aid 
proceedings. In the context of proceedings for reviewing State aid, it is presumed that 
the disclosure of the documents in the administrative file undermines the protection 
of the objective of investigation activities35.  
Similarly, in the context of merger documents the Court has recently recognized in 
Agrofert that a general presumption arises from Regulation 139/200436, which 
provides strict rules as to the access to documents in proceedings for the control of a 
merger. In particular, there is a general presumption that the disclosure of documents 
exchanged in a merger file undermines the protection of the commercial interests 
and the protection of the purposes of the investigations37. In this case, the Court puts 
forward that the general presumption applies regardless of whether the investigation 
is closed, as disclosure arising after the proceeding before the Commission may 
deter undertakings in the future from actively cooperating with the Commission38.  
As regards with cartel-related-documents and, in particular, information submitted by 
leniency applicants, it could be inferred that the approach concerning the general 
presumption of certain categories of documents applies. The general presumption 
would arise from the special interest of maintaining the confidentiality of leniency 
documents in order not to jeopardize the functioning of leniency programmes. 
Nevertheless, this question is still unclear. The case Enbw, which is pending before 
the Court, is expected to bring some light to this issue. We will further address the 
disclosure of leniency documents held by the Commission through the Transparency 
Regulation in chapter 3. 
Concerning leniency documents held by the NCAs, there are not common rules 
about the disclosure policy of competition documents. The Court has determined in 
Pfleiderer that national courts are responsible to determine under which conditions 
access must be permitted according to their own national law. We will explore in 
more detail these issues in chapter 4. 
 
3. Access to leniency documents held by the Commission  
The disclosure of leniency documents to third parties affected by a cartel entails a 
particular clash between the public and the private enforcement of antitrust law. As 
we have already illustrated, this clash touches upon two different stories. While 
leniency programmes are deemed a successful approach to strengthen the public 
enforcement of antitrust law in the context of cartels, the enforcement of competition 
law through damage actions is weak and concentrated in a minority of Member 
States.  
The application for leniency includes two kinds of documents to prove the existence 
of the cartel: corporate statements and pre-existing documents. These documents 
can be very useful for third parties willing to file follow-on damage actions against the 
cartelist. In particular, they help to prove the existence of damage and the causality 
between the damage and the infringement. Nevertheless, the cartelist might be 
deterred from applying for leniency if the competition authority allows third parties to 
gain access to the documents submitted by the applicants. Since leniency 
programmes do not grant immunity in the private enforcement arena, leniency 
applicants could hypothetically be found liable by a national court as a result of the 
documents they voluntarily submitted.  
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a.s, C-477/10, rec.64. 
38Ibid, rec.66. 
Claimants can attempt to request leniency materials through the Transparency 
Regulation or via national courts on the basis of Article 15(1). We start our analysis 
by describing and assessing this latter. In the last part of each section we share our 
thoughts about the use and effectiveness of both channels. 
 
3.1 Access via Article 15(1) of Regulation 1/2003 
Article 15(1) of Regulation 1/2003 enables national courts ‘to ask the Commission to 
transmit to them information in its possession’ in the context of the cooperation 
between national courts and the Commission. A claimant could thus persuade its 
national court to invoke this cooperation mechanism so as to obtain leniency 
materials.  
In this section we first present National Grid, a cornerstone case in this regard. Then 
we share some thoughts about the effectiveness of this channel in the context of the 
exercise of civil damage actions.  
 
3.1.1 National Grid: a cornerstone case 
National Grid can be divided in two parts. The first one touches upon the access to 
documents held by the Commission, whereas the second one deals with the 
disclosure of leniency materials in the defendant´s possession via a national civil 
procedure. 
National Grid Electricity Transmission (NGET) was claiming damages as a result of 
the Gas Insulated Switchgear (GIS) cartel, which was €750 million fined by the 
Commission in 2007. The English High Court received a disclosure request from 
NGET so as to accurately calculate the damage arising from the cartel.  
In July 2011 the High Court requested through Article 15 the responses to the 
Statement of Objections (SO) sent by the Commission to two French defendants, 
Alstom and Areva. The Commission issued a formal decision on January 2012 
providing access to the requested documents excluded leniency materials. This 
decision was based on two main arguments: (I) the fining decision had been already 
taken and (II) the documents could not be disclosed solely relying on the discovery 
mechanism since French law forbade it39.  
Alstom has appealed this disclosure decision before the GC on 12th April 2012 
arguing that leniency materials have been disclosed without its consent and has 
applied for interim measures40. On the 29th November 2012 the GC suspended the 
decision since it was not sure the Commission decision complied with the 
professional secrecy obligations of Article 339 TFEU. This was due, among other 
factors, to the fact that the confidentiality ring established by the High Court was 
composed by 92 people and not all of them were lawyers41. 
In the meantime between the request of information and the decision of the 
Commission, the Court delivered its preliminary ruling in Pfleiderer. According to it, 
the national court must take a decision as regards with its disclosure weighing the 
respective interests, the deterrence on one side and the compensation on the other, 
on a case-by-case basis42.  
The second part of the case involves a request from NGET for access to documents 
containing leniency materials (excluded in the first case) in the possession of the 
defendants ABB and Siemens. This request was made before the High Court 
following the English discovery procedure. The documents requested were the 
confidential version of the Commission decision in the GIS case, the responses to 
                                                          
39Judgment of the English High Court of Justice Chancery Division National Grid Electricity 
Transmission Plc v ABB & others, 4.4.2012. Case No: HC08C03243, 4.4.2012, rec.13. 
40Areva initially appealed as well but then withdrew it. 
41Order of the President of the General Court of 29 November 2012, Alstom v European Commission, T-
164/12, recs 56-59. 
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the SO by ABB group defendants, and the replies to the Commission’s request for 
information by the defendants ABB group and other defendants.  
In April 2012 the High Court allowed a partial disclosure of the Commission decision, 
‘very limited passages from a few’ of the replies to the Commission´s request for 
information and none of the responses to the SO by the defendants43. More relevant 
than the decision itself is the fact that the High Court had previously asked the 
Commission for an amicus curiae in relation with an interpretation of the Pfleiderer 
ruling. 
The Commission responded that Pfleiderer also applied to leniency documents that 
(I) had been submitted under a Commission´s programme (II) were in the possession 
of the defendant. In other words, a national court could order the disclosure of 
leniency documents in the possession of the defendant which were previously 
submitted to the Commission44.  
The Commission underlined that although Article 15(1) does not allow the disclosure 
of leniency materials by the Commission, it does not prevent national courts from 
ordering access to these documents via a discovery procedure applying Pfleiderer. 
Likewise, the national court must assess: 
1. Whether disclosure would increase the leniency applicant´s liability compared to 
non-cooperation parties45. 
2. Whether disclosure is proportionate in the light of its possible interference with 
leniency programmes46.  
The High Court followed the criteria put forward by the Commission and carried out a 
one-by-one analysis of the documents concerned. As regards with the first criterion, it 
ruled that there was not legitimate expectation of leniency applicants about the 
confidentiality of their statements47. When assessing the second criterion, the High 
Court acknowledged the relevance of leniency materials to prove the causation and 
the harm and the difficulty to obtain the requested information through other 
sources48. 
 
3.1.2 Comments on Article 15(1) as a mechanism to obtain leniency materials 
We would like to provide two remarks in this regard: one concerning the possibility to 
obtain leniency materials via Article 15(1) and another one about the effectiveness of 
this mechanism in the context of civil damage actions.  
The Cooperation Notice rejects the disclosure of the information submitted voluntarily 
by a leniency applicant without its consent49. This information would cover in principle 
corporate statements and pre-existing documents. However, it must be recalled that 
the Cooperation Notice does not have binding force and it only reflects the practice of 
the Commission. It is therefore interesting to see if the GC addresses this issue in 
Alstom appeal, especially, to see if it draws a difference between corporate 
statements and pre-existing documents. The disclosure of these latter does not 
jeopardize as much the use of leniency programmes since they could be obtained by 
competition authorities through dawn raids and they do not increase the applicant´s 
liability compare to the rest of the cartelists50. 
However, in our opinion the use of Article 15(1) does not seem very effective to 
promote civil damage actions. First, it must be recalled that Article 15(1) does not 
                                                          
43National Grid, supra n.41, rec.59. 
44Observations of the European Commission pursuant to article 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003 in National 
Grid, November 2011, rec.10. 
45Ibid, rec.16. 
46Ibid, rec.18. 
47National Grid, supra n.41, rec.34. 
48Ibid. recs 40-44. 
49Cooperation Notice, supra n.13, para.26. 
50Opinion of advocate general Mazák on 16 December 2010, Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, 
Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Bonn (Germany), C‑ 360/09, rec.47.  
provide claimants with a legal basis to obtain the documents, but they always depend 
on the receptiveness of the national court to this request. Second, it must be noted 
that in some jurisdictions, particularly those ones ruled by Civil Law tradition, the 
practice shows that it is uncommon to approach a national court without the relevant 
evidences to sustain the claim. Evidences are normally collected prior and not during 
the trial. The uncertainty regarding the content of the documents to be obtained 
represents another significant hurdle. 
As illustrated by the National Grid case, this formula might fit better with those 
jurisdictions ruled under the Common Law tradition, where collecting evidences 
during the trial is not so uncommon. Additionally, claimants can take advantage of 
Article 15(1) so as to strengthen the discovery procedure and gather as many 
evidences as possible. Likewise, the national court could require the disclosure of an 
index of content of the information held by the Commission51. Once the claimant 
knows more accurately the extent of the information submitted, it can invoke the 
discovery procedure so as to gain access to leniency materials in possession of the 
defendants. 
 
3.2 Access via the Transparency Regulation 
The access to leniency material through the Transparency Regulation entails mainly 
two issues. The first one is related to the way the Commission can handle the 
disclosure requests. The question at stake is if the Commission can dismiss the 
request on the basis of a general presumption without carrying out a case-by-case 
analysis through the exceptions of Article 4.2 of the Regulation, following the 
approach laid down in Agrofert regarding merger-related-documents and TGI in 
relation to State aid documents. The second issue touches upon the interpretation of 
the exceptions concerning the commercial interests and the purpose of 
investigations.  
In this part we plan to present the findings of the GC as regards with these two 
issues in CDC Peroxide and Enbw. Then we will provide some remarks about the 
effectiveness of this mechanism to gain access to leniency documents in the context 
of civil damage actions. 
 
3.2.1 Findings of the General Court in CDC Peroxide and Enbw 
On 15th December 2011 the GC annulled entirely the Commission decision in CDC 
Peroxide and clarified the interpretation of the exceptions contained in Article 4.2. 
CDC sought access to the statement of contents of the case-file in the Hydrogen 
Peroxide decision, where the Commission found a cartel in the hydrogen peroxide 
market. When the Commission dismissed its request on the grounds of the 
commercial interests and the purpose of investigations exceptions, CDC appealed 
before the GC. 
As regards with the commercial interests exception, the GC did not uphold the 
arguments of the Commission in the contested decision. In the first place, it pointed 
out that not all the information concerning the company can be entitled the protection 
conferred by the commercial interests exception. In particular, only ‘information 
concerning the business relations of the companies concerned, the prices of their 
products, their cost structure, their market share or similar’ should be protected under 
this exception52. The GC added that the interest of the companies that took part in 
the cartel in avoiding follow-on actions ‘cannot be regarded as commercial interests 
and, in any event, does not constitute an interest deserving of protection’53. 
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52Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 15 December 2011, CDC Hydrogene Peroxide 
Cartel Damage Claims (CDC Hydrogene Peroxide) v European Commission, T-437/08, recs 44-45. 
53Ibid, rec.49. 
The purpose of investigations exception was also rejected by the GC. The 
Commission had invoked this exception by stating that the leniency programme 
would be undermined if disclosure of leniency materials was allowed, as applicants 
might refrain from cooperating with the Commission in the future. Nevertheless, this 
interpretation was not accepted since it ‘would amount to permitting the Commission 
to avoid the application of the Transparency Regulation, without any limit in time, to 
any competition document merely by reference to a possible future adverse impact 
on its leniency program’54. The ruling also clarified the duration of the purpose of 
investigations exception as this ground is no longer valid ‘once the final decision is 
adopted, irrespective of where that decision might subsequently be annulled by the 
courts’55.  
The second relevant judgement of the GC took place on 22nd May 2012 in Enbw56. 
This case helped to further clarify how the Commission must deal with request for 
access to documents under the Transparency Regulation and it basically confirms 
the interpretation of the exceptions in relation to leniency materials. Energie-Baden-
Württemberg (Enbw) was an energy-distribution company that considered itself 
affected by the GIS cartel. As a result of this, it lodged a request for access to most 
of the documents related to the proceedings of the GIS cartel`s decision. The 
Commission denied access by arguing that the requested documents were covered 
by the exceptions touching upon the commercial interests and the purpose of 
investigations. 
As regards with the way the Commission handled the request, it divided the 
documents in five groups containing the same kind of information: (1) leniency 
statements and contemporaneous documents, (2) included information requests and 
their replies, (3) documents obtained in the course of dawn raids, (4) SOs and their 
replies and (5) internal documents. It pursued that the disclosure of any category 
would undermine the protection of the purpose of investigations and the disclosure of 
the first four categories would impede the protection of the commercial interests of 
the firms concerned.  
The GC annulled the decision since it found that the division into categories served 
no useful purpose. Likewise, the GC put forward that the use of categories of 
documents to avoid a one-by-one examination is lawful as long as it enables the 
Commission to apply a single line of reasoning to all the documents within one 
category57. However, the Commission´s reasoning for each of categories 1, 2, 4 and 
5 in the context of the exception for the purposes of the investigation is largely the 
same: the disclosure of that information would deter future potential leniency 
applicants and future addresses of requests for information from cooperating with the 
Commission58.  
Furthermore, the Commission argued the existence of a general presumption of no-
access to avoid the one-by-one examination as a result of Regulation 1/2003 and 
Regulation 773/2004, which restricts the access of third parties to the Commission´s 
file during the administrative proceedings, in clear analogy with the TGI judgement in 
the context of State aid. Thus, according to the Commission, the Regulation 1/2003 
should be regarded as a lex specialis of the Transparency Regulation and therefore 
prevails over this latter. Since the Commission already qualified as confidential some 
documents during the administrative proceedings following Regulation 1/200359, it 
was not required to accomplish an individual examination under the Transparency 
Regulation. 
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Commission, T-344/08. 
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The GC also rejected this argument of the Commission to avoid the individual and 
specific examination of the documents. It held that, whereas Regulation 1/2003 aims 
to protect the fundamental rights of defence of the investigated undertakings, the 
Transparency Regulation serves to guarantee the public right to access to the EU 
institutions documents. Consequently, the GC concluded that the fact that the 
Commission has already determined the degree of access during the administrative 
proceedings does not mean that the Commission can automatically avoid the 
individual examination under the Transparency Regulation60. 
As regards with the interpretation of the two exceptions in relation to the disclosure of 
leniency materials, the GC largely follows what stated in CDC Peroxide. It confirms 
that the commercial interests exception does not include the interest in avoiding 
liability as a result of damage actions and adds that commercial activities may stop 
being confidential with the passage of time61.  
Besides, the GC rejected the broad concept of investigations proposed by the 
Commission, which considers that it is not limited to the proceedings leading to the 
decision in a cartel case, but it wholly encompasses the Commission´s task of public 
enforcement of competition law. The investigation activities would be thus in peril if 
leniency documents were disclosed, as this would deter future leniency applicants62. 
The GC rejected this argument by confirming its position in CDC Peroxide and 
adding that the Commission`s fears for its leniency programme depend on a number 
of uncertain factors such as ‘(1)the use that the parties prejudiced by a cartel will 
make of the documents obtained,(2) the success of any actions which they may bring 
for damages,(3) the amounts which will be awarded them by the national courts and 
(4) the way in which undertakings participating in cartels will react in future’63. 
 
3.3.2 Comments on the Transparency Regulation as a tool to obtain leniency 
documents 
Our comments touch upon two issues. In the first place we assess in general terms 
the deterrent effect for future leniency applicants of the disclosure of leniency 
materials. In the second place, we provide our own legal analysis about the 
Transparency Regulation as a tool to gain access to leniency materials.  
 
What is the deterrent effect of the disclosure of leniency materials? 
We are sceptical about the ‘official truth’ regarding the deterrent effect arising from 
the disclosure of leniency materials. This official truth is based on the assumption 
that a cartelist applies for leniency only to totally avoid a financial loss as a result of a 
sanction. Obviously, for the cartelist it does not make a difference if the financial loss 
happens as a result of public enforcement or civil damage actions.  
This argument can often be true, although we are not sure that is per se true. Thus, 
cartelists sometimes apply for leniency to avoid partially, and not totally, a financial 
loss. One example of this situation may happen when another cartelist has already 
blown the whistle. Another example was set by the English High Court in National 
Grid, where it put forward that a cartelist may apply for leniency due to the risk of 
leniency applications by other participants, although this entailed potential civil 
damages consequences for all64. The high scale of fines set by the Commission 
together with the lack of treble damages within the EU jurisdictions enable us to think 
that cartelists might be more afraid of fines than of damages. 
It might also be possible that a cartelist decides to blow the whistle not to avoid a 
financial loss, but to cause a financial loss to its competitors. The whistleblower 
would be then attempting to gain a comparative advantage vis-à-vis its former 
                                                          
60Enbw ruling, supra n. 59, recs 143-145. 
61Ibid, rec.142. 
62Ibid, rec.124. 
63Ibid, rec.125. 
64National Grid, supra n.40, rec.37. 
partners. This reasoning should not be too easily dismissed if we take into account 
that cartels normally encompass the main operators in the market.  
 
Does the Transparency Regulation allow the disclosure of leniency materials? 
The answer to this question is still unclear. This is basically due to the fact that the 
Court has not followed the same approach of CDC Peroxide and Enbw, whose 
judgements were taken by the same GC Chamber, when it overruled the decision of 
the GC in Agrofert.  
Thus, in Agrofert the Court has recognized the existence of a general presumption 
that the documents submitted to the Commission during merger proceedings fall 
under the exceptions of purpose of investigations and commercial interests. 
Interestingly enough, the Court followed a broader concept of investigation than the 
one set in CDC Peroxide and Enbw since it considers that it does not only refer to the 
period of time until a decision is taken by the Commission. In contrast, it interpreted 
the exception of the purpose of investigations in an abstract way as encompassing 
the general activity of the Commission in the enforcement of competition law. It thus 
concluded that the disclosure of merger-related-documents even after the decision 
may deter undertakings from cooperating in the future with the Commission.  
If the Court decides to take this abstract approach in Enbw, it might conclude that the 
documents submitted by the leniency applicant are presumed to fall within the 
purpose of investigations exception, since its disclosure may jeopardize the use of 
the leniency programmes and therefore the investigations activity of the Commission. 
This is exactly what the Commission argued unsuccessfully in CDC Peroxide and 
Enbw before the GC. However, it must be noted that leniency documents are 
submitted according to the Leniency Notice, which does not have the same 
normative value as the Transparency Regulation. The Court may not thus recognize 
the existence of a general presumption arising from a soft law text. 
Nevertheless, if the Court decides to still follow the Agrofert approach, it should set a 
difference between the two types of leniency materials: corporate statements and 
pre-existing documents. As we have already stated, the disclosure of pre-existing 
documents entails a low deterrent effect. We hence conclude that the general 
presumption of the purpose of investigations exception should not include them. 
As regards with the exception of commercial interests, it would be harder for the 
Court to follow the reasoning set in Agrofert. Documents submitted to the 
Commission in the context of merger proceedings normally contain sensitive 
commercial information such as prices, market shares or business strategies. In 
contrast, we cannot draw the same conclusion in relation with leniency materials, 
whose content can only be qualified as commercially sensitive on a case-by-case 
basis. 
Our legal analysis of the relevant case law leads us to think that the Transparency 
Regulation should allow the disclosure of pre-existing documents, but not of 
corporate statements. These latter would fall under the general presumption 
regarding the purpose of investigations exception. 
 
4. Access to leniency materials held by NCAs  
The issues related to the clash between private and public enforcement also arise in 
the context of access to leniency documents in the possession of the NCAs of the 
EU. The hybrid nature of the NCAs (they apply both national and EU law) together 
with the lack of clear EU legislation triggered uncertainty as regards with the regime 
of access to leniency materials held by the NCAs.  
We have already seen in National Grid that Pfleiderer ruling may also have an impact 
on the access to documents in the possession of the Commission. Nevertheless, we 
think that this chapter is more appropriate to carry out the description and analysis of 
Pfleiderer, since this ruling mostly targets the functioning of the NCAs. Then, we go 
through some examples of the follow-up of Pfleiderer in some EU jurisdictions. As 
usual, we end up the chapter providing some comments about the issues at stake.  
 
4.1 Pfleiderer ruling: a case-by-case approach weighing the interests protected by 
EU law 
Pfleiderer was the customer of the firms involved in the decor paper industry cartel, 
which was found by the German NCA as a result of a leniency application. On the 
22nd February 2008 it sought access to the case file, which was in the possession of 
the NCA and contained leniency materials and this led to a preliminary reference 
before the Court. 
In his opinion, Advocate General (AG) Mazák tries to conciliate the interests of both 
public and private enforcement by proposing a distinction between corporate 
statements, which should always remain confidential, and pre-existing documents, 
whose disclosure could be granted after an individual examination65.  
On the 14th June 2011, the Court considered that persons seeking to obtain damages 
cannot be per se prevented from gaining access to leniency documents. However, 
the conditions under such access must be permitted are to be decided by national 
courts on the basis of their national law. This task entails a case-by-case approach 
weighing the interests protected by EU law66, namely the defence of public 
enforcement via leniency programmes against the promotion of private enforcement 
through civil damage actions.  
 
4.2 The follow-up of Pfleiderer in relation with access to leniency materials held by 
NCAs 
We have already described the follow-up of Pfleiderer ruling and the amicus curiae 
submitted by the Commission in National Grid. Nevertheless, this case does not 
touch upon documents held by a NCA, but rather upon documents in the possession 
of either the Commission or the defendants. Hence, in this section we provide a brief 
overview about how national courts have reacted to Pfleiderer ruling when 
addressing the issue of access to leniency materials held respectively by a NCA and 
a national court in Germany and Austria.  
 
4.2.1 Germany: a tough approach against disclosure 
The follow-up of Pfleiderer once the national court received the preliminary reference 
from the Court shows that national German courts have adopted a tough approach 
against disclosure. In January 2012 the court of Bonn refused to grant the disclosure 
since it considered that the purpose of the investigations could be jeopardized. This 
legal basis67 to deny access to documents resembles to the one provided by Article 
4.2 of the Transparency Regulation. The German court has followed a broad 
interpretation of the concept investigation, which is not limited to the investigation at 
stake, but it also covers the overall activity of competition authorities in detecting 
cartels.  
Since the decision of the Bundeskartellamt has binding effect before the national 
court, it was argued that leniency programmes also contribute indirectly to the 
success of cartel damage actions. Additionally, it was underlined the limited role of 
leniency materials in the calculation of the quantum of the damage and the 
availability of alternative elements to prove the existence of a damage68.  
 
4.2.2 Austria: a blanket ban on access to court documents is against the principle of 
effectiveness  
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The analysis of the follow-up of Pfleiderer ruling before national courts brings us to 
address the Donau Chimie case, which takes place within the Austrian jurisdiction. 
The case involves a trade association which seeks access to the documents of the 
file related to the proceedings against the cartel of distributors of printing chemical. It 
must be noted that in Austria the competition authority acts as a prosecutor before a 
Court, but it does not adopt administrative infringement decisions. As a result of this, 
the request of access to the case file was made to the national court and not to the 
competition authority. 
The Austrian Law on Cartels69 precludes third party access to court files of public law 
competition proceeding absent the consent of the parties to the proceedings. 
Nevertheless, the Austrian court wanted to know if this blanket ban on access to 
court documents was in breach with the EU principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence.  
The Court published its preliminary ruling on the 6th July 2013 and also found that the 
Austrian law was in breach with the principle of effectiveness. It underlines that the 
access to leniency documents could ‘be the only opportunity those persons have to 
obtain the evidence needed on which to base their claim for compensation’. It is thus 
concluded that the Austrian ban makes the exercise of the right to compensation 
excessively difficult70.  
 
4.3 Comments on access to leniency materials held by NCAs 
Although less than two years have passed since Pfleiderer, we can already see that 
national courts have taken different approaches as regards with the case-by-case 
analysis of the disclosure of leniency materials. Likewise, while the German and 
Austrian courts do not enable claimants to gain access to leniency documents, the 
English High Court has taken a softer approach. This asymmetry is likely to be 
reproduced across the rest of EU jurisdictions. Hence, the countries which intervened 
in support of the Austrian blanket ban rule (Spain, Belgium, Italy and France) are 
likely to advocate for keeping the confidentiality of leniency documents, whereas 
nordic countries committed to a high level of transparency might allow partial 
disclosure.  
This brings us to assess the two main criticisms of Pfleiderer ruling: the forum 
shopping and the legal uncertainty arisen as a result of the ruling.  
 
4.3.1 Pfleiderer & forum shopping 
Some commentators have warned that Pfleiderer may lead to a situation where 
damage claimants elect to apply to claimant-friendly jurisdictions for disclosure of 
leniency materials before in other jurisdictions71. However, we think that the impact of 
Pfleiderer in terms of choosing jurisdictions is insignificant. 
In any case Pfleiderer would affect the behaviour of leniency applicants and not of 
damage claimants. Leniency applicants are the ones who could be persuaded to 
apply for leniency in those jurisdictions where leniency materials remain confidential 
in the possession of competition authorities72. Civil claimants would have no choice 
and would be then forced to request disclosure in those jurisdictions.  
In those cases with multiple leniency applications before different NCAs, we 
acknowledge that the different attitudes towards disclosure among national 
jurisdictions could be merely one more factor to take into consideration when 
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choosing where to sue. As we presented in the first chapter, private enforcement 
mechanisms are characterized by a great diversity: substantive provisions, costs of 
litigation, the duration of the procedures or limitation period of the actions are just 
examples of the elements to be taken into account in the election of the court. With 
such a heterogeneous scenario forum shopping might exist with or without Pfleiderer. 
 
4.3.2 Pfleiderer & legal uncertainty 
The second criticism is the legal uncertainty arising as a result of Pfleiderer, which 
may constitute a deterrent effect for potential whistleblowers. In other words, cartelist 
may be discouraged to apply for leniency not because their documents will be 
disclosed, but because their documents might be disclosed73. This argument seems 
again unfounded to us.  
What law firms criticize in Pfleiderer is the fact that the Court has not taken any 
decision at all and has kicked the ball back into the national field74. Obviously, they 
were expecting a strong statement against disclosure. The problem is that the Court 
could not say so since there is not a single piece of EU legislation which explicitly 
forbids the disclosure of leniency materials75.  
It cannot be said that Pfleiderer adds legal uncertainty. Similarly to what happens 
with forum shopping, we can state that there was already legal uncertainty (otherwise 
the German court would not have referred a preliminary ruling) and that this did not 
constitute an obstacle to the success of leniency programmes. Before Pfleiderer 
leniency applicants could neither be entirely sure, nor have a legitimate expectation, 
that the material submitted was going to remain confidential according to EU law. 
And this did not prevent them from applying for leniency. 
 
5. Recommendations 
In the light of our aforementioned comments, we believe that the current legal 
framework regarding access to leniency materials needs a substantial modification. 
The Commission shares this idea since it has recently launched a legislative 
proposal on actions for damages to ensure effective damage actions before national 
courts for breaches of EU antitrust rules. 
Our recommendations regarding the optimal regime of access to leniency materials 
held by competition authorities can be divided in seven issues. We address each 
issue with a question and answer. 
 
1.Should the disclosure of leniency materials be addressed through a specific or a 
general regime? 
We have seen that the current system of access to public documents at EU level, 
which does not explicitly refer to leniency materials, represents a source of 
controversy. We advocate for a specific clause that deals with the disclosure of 
leniency materials. In the first place, the enforcement of cartel infringement is so 
important for the society welfare that its different aspects require particular attention. 
In the second place, leniency materials have features which make them completely 
different from the rest of the documents held by public administrations. 
 
2. Should we have the same disclosure regime for the Commission and the NCAs? 
Cartels are often international and competition law is a EU matter. The issues 
regarding the disclosure of leniency materials are the same regardless the 
competition authority involved. We cannot but propose the same regime of disclosure 
for the Commission and NCAs. 
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3. How should the rules dealing with the disclosure of leniency materials be? 
They should be easily applied by an administrative body within a short period. We 
therefore advocate for clear rules that do not involve weighing interests on case-by-
case basis. Not only this produces legal uncertainty, but also it entails delays that 
may jeopardize the exercise of damage actions. In particular, we propose a regime 
that set a difference between the two main categories of leniency documents: 
corporate statements and pre-existing documents. 
 
4. Should leniency materials be disclosed by competition authorities? 
Following our last classification, we think that corporate statements should remain 
confidential while pre-existing documents should be disclosed upon request on a 
general basis. We consider that the disclosure of corporate statements entail three 
potential risks that do not happen with pre-existing documents. First, its disclosure 
entails a deterrent effect for leniency programmes, since these documents only exists 
as a result of this kind of programmes. In contrast, pre-existing documents can 
always be obtained through dawn raids. Second, its disclosure might jeopardize the 
right against self-incrimination, which is part of the constitutional traditions of some 
Member States. Third, its disclosure is likely to represent a comparative 
disadvantage for the leniency applicant vis à vis the rest of the cartelists.  
The disclosure of pre-existing documents can contribute to foster the private 
enforcement of cartel infringements and, in particular, help plaintiffs to prove the 
damage and the causality. As a result of the secret nature of cartels, plaintiffs 
struggle to obtain evidence to support its claim. It is hence advisable to allow them to 
take advantage of the information gathered during public enforcement proceedings.  
 
5. What happens if leniency materials contain commercial information or if public 
proceedings are still on going? 
We consider that pre-existing documents do not normally contain sensitive 
commercial information as defined by the GC. In the same vein, we also think that 
the right of compensation of the victims outweighs the right of the cartelist to avoid 
the disclosure of such information. Finally, the case-by-case examination of pre-
existing documents to determine if they contain commercial interests is time-
consuming and undermines the interests of the plaintiffs. We therefore conclude that 
pre-existing documents do not need an examination to be disclosed. 
However, we think that the disclosure of leniency materials must not alter the 
investigation carried out by competition authorities. We hence advocates for the 
disclosure of pre-existing document once the infringement decision has been taken. 
 
6. Do third parties need to show a legitimate interest to gain access to pre-existing 
documents? 
This is quite a sensitive point since it involves a potential clash between two 
interests. On the one hand, if a legitimate interest is required, competition authorities 
will dispose of an easy ground to refuse the requests. In the same vein, the analysis 
of the legitimate interest constitutes an administrative burden that may lead to a 
delay to satisfy the request. 
On the other hand, if there is no need to show a legitimate interest, the commercial 
interests that might be included in the pre-existing documents will be available for 
public at large.  
We think that the interest of a proper private enforcement outweighs the 
confidentiality interest of the cartelist. We therefore consider that third parties do not 
need to show a legitimate interest. 
 
 
 
7. How should competition authorities deal with the requests? 
We believe that the Commission and some NCAs tend to be reluctant in practice to 
disclose information. We are concerned about the impact of this in the context of 
leniency material and private enforcement. Time is a very delicate issue since the 
limitation period to bring damage actions is usually quite short and not aligned with 
the time length of administrative proceedings. 
We therefore advise competition authorities to give priority to requests of leniency 
documents, especially if there are clear signs of a legitimate interest. Furthermore, 
we consider that the Ombudsman and the Court have a key role to play when 
ensuring that the Commission effectively applies the legal regime regarding the 
disclosure of leniency documents. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 The prosperity of Antitrust Land involves attaining a high standard of living of 
all its citizens. Thus, citizens from Private Enforcement Town (the concrete 
consumer), deserve the same level of protection than citizens from Public 
Enforcement Town, (the abstract consumer). Since Public Enforcement Town enjoys 
already a good health, the Mayor should focus his efforts on strengthening Private 
Enforcement Town. 
 In order to achieve this, it is important to foster the interactions between both 
towns. We hence suggest the Mayor to build the bridge. However, we think it is a bit 
risky to locate it between the hearts of both towns since tourists might be frightened 
by the bad reputation of Private Enforcement Town. A bridge linking the surroundings 
of both towns will be enough to transmit the positive ‘spillovers’ from Public 
Enforcement Town to Private Enforcement Town without entailing such a risk. 
Our advice to the Major is highly influenced by our perception regarding the 
deterrence effect of the disclosure of leniency materials. We do not believe that there 
is a per se deterrent effect for leniency programmes linked to the disclosure of 
leniency material. The disclosure of pre-existing documents entails such a low 
deterrent effect that it is clearly overweighed by the benefits it brings in the private 
enforcement arena. However, we agree that the disclosure or corporate statements 
may prevent future cartelists from applying for leniency.  
The current legislation at EU level provides claimants with two potential paths to 
obtain leniency materials held by the Commission. The mechanisms of cooperation 
between the Commission and national courts set in Article 15 of Regulation 1/2003 
represent the first option. However, this alternative entails several shortcomings that 
impede its effectiveness in several jurisdictions. 
The second option is the Transparency Regulation, whose interpretation as regards 
with the disclosure of leniency material is to be clarified by the Court in Enbw. It is 
difficult to draw conclusions about its scope, since the GC in CDC Peroxide and 
Enbw and the Court in Agrofert have hold diverging views in this regard.  
According to our legal analysis, the Court should recognize the existence of a 
general presumption of non-disclosure of corporate statements as a result of the 
purpose of the investigations exception. In contrast, since the disclosure of pre-
existing documents does not jeopardize the existence of leniency programmes, we 
expect the Court not to include them within the general presumption and therefore to 
allow its disclosure.  
Regardless of the outcome in Enbw, we advocate for the adoption of a legislative 
proposal that establishes a specific regime for the disclosure of leniency materials. 
This regime should broadly allow the universal disclosure of pre-existing documents, 
and not corporate statements, to all the individuals once the infringement decision 
has been taken. Additionally, the proposal should include mechanisms to ensure that 
the Commission fulfills promptly this duty, since delays jeopardize the exercise of the 
civil actions. 
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